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Introduction 
 
 
An Atmosphere of Growing Political and 
Societal Instability in Ukraine 
Susan Stewart 
For some time now, both Ukrainians and foreign observers have been inquiring whether 
the time is right for a ‘Third Maidan’. The protests that took place on 17 October 2017 
and in subsequent weeks were not the beginning of anything larger. Rather, they were 
initiated primarily by political actors and did not have the potential for mass mobili-
zation. However, these protests convey important messages about the political and 
societal situation in the country. Against the backdrop of developments in recent years, 
they are a sign that the situation could heat up dangerously in the coming months. 
 
Four years on from the Euromaidan, the 
Ukrainian population has hardly benefited 
from the reforms implemented so far. Elec-
tricity and gas prices have increased con-
siderably and, according to surveys, the 
general social and economic situation has 
deteriorated rather than improved. There 
are also no indications that those who 
plundered the country and violently at-
tacked Maidan protesters have been held 
accountable. While the ruling elite can 
point to significant progress on macro-
economic developments and relations with 
the EU, it is becoming increasingly clear 
that the fight against corruption stops when 
it affects the key interests of political and 
economic leaders. This group includes the 
President, many ministers and influential 
parliamentarians, heads of key authorities, 
as well as oligarchs and their confidants. 
The inadequate fight against corruption in 
the milieu of these elites calls into question 
the reform progress accomplished thus far. 
In addition, Ukrainians are still dying almost 
daily in the Donbas. For all these reasons, 
dissatisfaction among the population is 
high. Even though many in the country rec-
ognize that instability in Ukraine could 
easily be exploited by Russia, their patience 
with today’s elites has its limits. 
Protests: not much stamina 
On 17 October 2017, several thousand pro-
testers marched in front of the Ukrainian 
Parliament (Verkhovna Rada). They made 
three demands: the creation of an anti-
corruption court, electoral reform towards 
a proportional representation system with 
open party lists, and the abolition of parlia-
mentary immunity. All these issues are at 
least indirectly related to the fight against 
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corruption and have long been under dis-
cussion. However, by 20 October, the total 
number of protesters had fallen from around 
4,500 to only a few hundred, despite none 
of the relevant laws having been adopted. 
Two draft immunity bills were passed to 
the Constitutional Court for review and the 
first reading of legislation on changes to 
the electoral system has now been adopted 
by the Rada, although it is not yet binding. 
When President Poroshenko finally did table 
a draft bill on 22 December to establish an 
anti-corruption tribunal, it met with strong 
criticism from some parts of Ukrainian civil 
society. The President was accused of dis-
regarding recommendations made by the 
Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 
when drafting the legislation and thus cre-
ating loopholes that would allow the court 
to be controlled by political authorities. 
Respected civil society organizations (the 
Reanimation Package of Reforms, the Anti-
corruption Action Centre (AntAC) and the 
Chesno movement) and some younger par-
liamentarians (including Mustafa Nayem 
and Yehor Sobolev) had called for the Octo-
ber protests. The former Georgian Presi-
dent, Mikheil Saakashvili, and his Move-
ment of New Forces also played a very 
prominent role. Saakashvili called for a law 
on impeachment and continued the protest 
after 19 October, although most protesters 
had already left the camp by then. Saakash-
vili remained at the camp in front of the 
Rada until the beginning of December. 
After a failed attempt by law enforcement 
authorities to detain him there, he was 
finally arrested on 8 December after mas-
sive clashes between his supporters and 
the police. He is currently being prosecuted 
for supporting a criminal organization. 
He allegedly received $500,000 from Serhii 
Kurchenko, a Ukrainian oligarch currently 
living in Russia and a supporter of former 
President Viktor Yanukovych, to finance – 
among other things - the Rada protests. 
Saakashvili denies the allegations. His ap-
plication for political asylum in Ukraine 
has been rejected but is subject to appeal. 
Politics: intrigue and weak decision-
making  
While the recent protests have not been 
key events for Ukraine, they have provided 
important clues as to the political and soci-
etal situation in the country. Firstly, they 
show that many political forces are already 
positioning themselves for the parliamen-
tary and presidential elections, which will 
both take place in 2019. This not only ap-
plies to Saakashvili but also to all political 
parties represented in parliament, to Presi-
dent Petro Poroshenko and to other poten-
tial presidential candidates. By and large, 
Ukraine is currently experiencing a period 
of political intrigues in which forging tac-
tical alliances and bartering deals are more 
important than political content and reform 
initiatives. 
Secondly, the protests indicate a certain 
fragmentation of opposition forces. Saakash-
vili and his supporters, on the one hand, 
and civil society activists and reform-oriented 
parliamentarians, on the other, do not 
always speak the same language. Saakash-
vili’s case is certainly special because of his 
colourful personality, his past as the Presi-
dent of Georgia and his outsider status in 
the fabric of Ukrainian politics. However, 
attempts by other Ukrainian oppositionists 
to generate a common political approach 
in order to play a stronger role both inside 
and outside Parliament have also been 
largely unsuccessful so far. This applies to 
both the ‘Eurooptimists’ in the Rada and 
the supporters of the ‘Demalliance’ party 
which was intended to unite these new 
forces. 
Thirdly, the methods chosen to deal with 
Saakashvili (and the protest phenomenon 
as a whole) reveal the difficulties and fears 
of today’s Ukrainian leadership, whose 
actions are often contradictory. On the one 
hand, top political figures are aware that 
harsh treatment of demonstrators could 
provoke further protests. This is a lesson 
from the Euromaidan that today’s leader-
ship has taken to heart. On the other hand, 
Poroshenko, in particular, is not willing to 
tolerate serious competition. Even Saakash-
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vili seems to belong to this category be-
cause - although he does not legally qualify 
as a presidential candidate - he stirs up anti-
Poroshenko sentiment among the popula-
tion. So the leadership is not adhering to 
a consistent line with regard to its political 
opponents: Even though Saakashvili has 
had his citizenship revoked, he has not 
been expelled for illegally entering the coun-
try and is allowed to organize opposition 
protests. Such inconsistency is typical of 
the way the government generally deals 
with protest, as the economic blockades 
of the Crimea (autumn 2015) and the occu-
pied territories of the Donbas (early 2017) 
have shown. In both cases, the government 
initially criticized the protests but ended 
up adopting the protesters’ demands by 
banning much of the trade between the 
occupied and unoccupied territories. This 
testifies to a certain weakness with regard 
to decision-making and, furthermore, calls 
the state’s monopoly on the use of force 
seriously into question because the coun-
try’s leadership was unable to put an end 
to the protests without accepting the pro-
testers’ agenda. This is especially dangerous 
in circumstances where there are many 
weapons in circulation and people are 
becoming increasingly accustomed to the 
idea of using violence to resolve conflicts. 
Increasing dissatisfaction among 
the populace 
The recent demonstrations and other events 
have shown that the need to protest is not 
particularly widespread among Ukrainian 
citizens at the moment. The opinion that 
such demonstrations cannot effectively 
influence political decisions is quite preva-
lent. Furthermore, many citizens are un-
willing to support political forces by par-
ticipating in actions the latter have called 
for. This was already to some extent the 
case during the Euromaidan. The opposi-
tion politicians who were the most visible 
at the time (Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Vitali 
Klitschko and Oleh Tyahnybok) were viewed 
with great scepticism by the population. 
At the same time, concern and even 
anger over the lack of positive reform 
results are becoming ever more pronounced 
in society. Ukrainian citizens do not per-
ceive any improvement in their daily lives 
and are increasingly aware that top-level 
corruption is not being tackled sustainably. 
In addition, fraudsters and proponents of 
violence from the Yanukovych era have not 
been held accountable because they have 
accomplices among the ruling elite protect-
ing them from prosecution. The combina-
tion of a poor economic and social situation 
and an elite that enriches itself at the ex-
pense of the population can lead to serious 
consequences for the Ukrainian state, espe-
cially since Russian actors are more than 
willing to exploit any instability in the 
country in order to further weaken Kyiv. 
Despite the low number of participants 
in recent protests, anti-corruption is a key 
issue for large sections of the Ukrainian 
population, as are conflict resolution in the 
Donbas and socio-economic issues such as 
inflation, unemployment, social protection, 
etc. Earlier protests, including the trade 
blockade mentioned above, have shown 
that the Donbas situation is a sensitive topic. 
Social problems have not usually led to 
such intense protests, and if they have, 
then primarily within the context of a par-
ticular profession, such as doctors or miners. 
However, the amalgamation of socio-eco-
nomic difficulties, insufficient anti-corrup-
tion measures and continuing violence in 
the Donbas can be dangerous, particularly 
in a situation where politicians resort to 
populist slogans to discredit their oppo-
nents and gain greater support for them-
selves and their parties in the upcoming 
elections. 
Acknowledging and 
protecting society 
Even though there are currently no mass 
protests in Ukraine, the country’s political 
and social climate is heating up and will 
probably continue to do so in the course 
of 2018. Political deals and intrigues will 
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become increasingly evident and, given 
the social situation and the inadequate 
fight against corruption, the mood among 
the populace will turn even more negative, 
especially since no substantial successes 
in bringing peace to the Donbas can be 
expected. In this situation, the President 
will rely heavily on the EU card, as he has 
something to show here: the Association 
Agreement, which has now fully entered 
into force, and successful visa liberali-
zation, including a visa-free regime for 
Ukrainians to make short trips to the EU. 
These achievements are indeed real, but 
they will remain sustainable only if Ukrain-
ian politicians and bureaucrats commit to 
a fundamental overhaul of the political and 
economic system. This has not happened yet. 
As a result, the EU should send clear sig-
nals that setbacks in the reform process will 
have negative consequences for the Ukrain-
ian elite. In the short term, the independ-
ence and functionality of the National Anti-
Corruption Bureau (NABU) must be ensured 
and an autonomous anti-corruption court 
established. In the medium term, the EU 
should push for genuine reform of the Pros-
ecutor General’s Office. It would also be ad-
visable to pay more attention to the social 
dimension of the reforms. In particular, the 
EU should closely monitor the implemen-
tation of reforms in the health sector (to-
gether with Ukrainian experts) as they pro-
vide an opportunity to bring concrete posi-
tive changes for citizens. The implementa-
tion of pension and education reforms also 
deserves greater attention. Finally, looking 
to the future of Ukraine, German and EU 
actors should contribute to creating oppor-
tunities for the emergence of a new elite. 
This could take the form of training semi-
nars abroad, but also of closer cooperation 
with key institutions in the Ukrainian edu-
cational system, such as the Mohyla Acad-
emy in Kyiv or the Catholic University in 
Lviv. 
Russian aggression against Ukraine has 
bound together a large part of the Ukrain-
ian population, but that will not suffice if 
their leadership lacks the will to accommo-
date society and acknowledge that the 
interests and needs of citizens should be 
given priority. The current absence of mass 
protests should not hide the fact that dis-
content in Ukrainian society has reached 
worrying levels and continues to grow. The 
population has so far been confronted by 
the indifference of a ruling elite that cares 
first and foremost about its own interests. 
Mass protests could result from this con-
stellation of factors, but they are not a given. 
However, the current state of affairs could 
be used by both Russian actors and populist 
and nationalist forces in Ukraine to bring 
about a dangerously unstable situation. © Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2018 
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